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Abstract We give a rigorous characterization of what it means for a program-
ming language to be memory safe, capturing the intuition that memory safety sup-
ports local reasoning about state. We formalize this principle in two ways. First,
we show how a small memory-safe language validates a noninterference prop-
erty: a program can neither affect nor be affected by unreachable parts of the state.
Second, we extend separation logic, a proof system for heap-manipulating pro-
grams, with a “memory-safe variant” of its frame rule. The new rule is stronger
because it applies even when parts of the program are buggy or malicious, but
also weaker because it demands a stricter form of separation between parts of the
program state. We also consider a number of pragmatically motivated variations
on memory safety and the reasoning principles they support. As an application of
our characterization, we evaluate the security of a previously proposed dynamic
monitor for memory safety of heap-allocated data.
1 Introduction
Memory safety, and the vulnerabilities that follow from its absence [43], are common
concerns. So what is it, exactly? Intuitions abound, but translating them into satisfying
formal definitions is surprisingly difficult [20].
In large part, this difficulty stems from the prominent role that informal, everyday
intuition assigns, in discussions of memory safety, to a range of errors related to memory
misuse—buffer overruns, double frees, etc. Characterizing memory safety in terms of
the absence of these errors is tempting, but this falls short for two reasons. First, there is
often disagreement on which behaviors qualify as errors. For example, many real-world
C programs intentionally rely on unrestricted pointer arithmetic [28], though it may
yield undefined behavior according to the language standard [21, §6.5.6]. Second, from
the perspective of security, the critical issue is not the errors themselves, but rather the
fact that, when they occur in unsafe languages like C, the program’s ensuing behavior
is determined by obscure, low-level factors such as the compiler’s choice of run-time
memory layout, often leading to exploitable vulnerabilities. By contrast, in memory-
safe languages like Java, programs can attempt to access arrays out of bounds, but such
mistakes lead to sensible, predictable outcomes.
Rather than attempting a definition in terms of bad things that cannot happen, we
aim to formalize memory safety in terms of reasoning principles that programmers
can soundly apply in its presence (or conversely, principles that programmers should
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not naively apply in unsafe settings, because doing so can lead to serious bugs and
vulnerabilities). Specifically, to give an account of memory safety, as opposed to more
inclusive terms such as “type safety,” we focus on reasoning principles that are common
to a wide range of stateful abstractions, such as records, tagged or untagged unions,
local variables, closures, arrays, call stacks, objects, compartments, and address spaces.
What sort of reasoning principles? Our inspiration comes from separation logic [36],
a variant of Hoare logic designed to verify complex heap-manipulating programs. The
power of separation logic stems from local reasoning about state: to prove the correct-
ness of a program component, we must argue that its memory accesses are confined
to a footprint, a precise region demarcated by the specification. This discipline allows
proofs to ignore regions outside of the footprint, while ensuring that arbitrary invariants
for these regions are preserved during execution.
The locality of separation logic is deeply linked to memory safety. Consider a hy-
pothetical jpeg decoding procedure that manipulates image buffers. We might expect
its execution not to interfere with the integrity of an unrelated window object in the
program. We can formalize this requirement in separation logic by proving a specifica-
tion that includes only the image buffers, but not the window, in the decoder’s footprint.
Showing that the footprint is respected would amount to checking the bounds of indi-
vidual buffer accesses, thus enforcing memory safety; conversely, if the decoder is not
memory safe, a simple buffer overflow might suffice to tamper with the window object,
thus violating locality and potentially paving the way to an attack.
Our aim is to extend this line of reasoning beyond conventional separation logic,
seeking to encompass settings such as ML, Java, or Lisp that enforce memory safety au-
tomatically without requiring complete correctness proofs—which can be prohibitively
expensive for large code bases, especially in the presence of third-party libraries or plu-
gins over which we have little control. The key observation is that memory safety forces
code to respect a natural footprint: the set of its reachable memory locations (reachable
with respect to the variables it mentions). Suppose that the jpeg decoder above is writ-
ten in Java. Though we may not know much about its input-output behavior, we can
still assert that it cannot have any effect on the window object simply by replacing the
detailed reasoning demanded by separation logic by a simple inaccessibility check.
Our first contribution is to formalize local reasoning principles supported by an
ideal notion of memory safety, using a simple language (§2) to ground our discussion.
We show three results (Theorems 1, 3 and 4) that explain how the execution of a piece
of code is affected by extending its initial heap. These results lead to a noninterference
property (Corollary 1), ensuring that code cannot affect or be affected by unreachable
memory. In §3.3, we show how these results yield a variant of the frame rule of sep-
aration logic (Theorem 6), which embodies its local reasoning capabilities. The two
variants have complementary strengths and weaknesses: while the original rule applies
to unsafe settings like C, but requires comprehensively verifying individual memory ac-
cesses, our variant does not require proving that every access is correct, but demands a
stronger notion of separation between memory regions. These results have been verified
with the Coq proof assistant.4
4 The proofs are available at: https://github.com/arthuraa/memory-safe-language.
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Our second contribution (§4) is to evaluate pragmatically motivated relaxations of
the ideal notion above, exploring various trade-offs between safety, performance, flex-
ibility, and backwards compatibility. These variants can be broadly classified into two
groups according to reasoning principles they support. The stronger group gives up on
some secrecy guarantees, but still ensures that pieces of code cannot modify the con-
tents of unreachable parts of the heap. The weaker group, on the other hand, leaves gaps
that completely invalidate reachability-based reasoning.
Our third contribution (§5) is to demonstrate how our characterization applies to
more realistic settings, by analyzing a heap-safety monitor for machine code [5, 15].
We prove that the abstract machine that it implements also satisfies a noninterference
property, which can be transferred to the monitor via refinement, modulo memory ex-
haustion issues discussed in §4. These proofs are also done in Coq.5
We discuss related work on memory safety and stronger reasoning principles in
§6, and conclude in §7. While memory safety has seen prior formal investigation (e.g.
[31,41]), our characterization is the first phrased in terms of reasoning principles that are
valid when memory safety is enforced automatically. We hope that these principles can
serve as good criteria for formally evaluating such enforcement mechanisms in practice.
Moreover, our definition is self-contained and does not rely on additional features such
as full-blown capabilities, objects, module systems, etc. Since these features tend to
depend on some form of memory safety anyway, we could see our characterization as
a common core of reasoning principles that underpin all of them.
2 An Idealized Memory-Safe Language
Our discussion begins with a concrete case study: a simple imperative language with
manual memory management. It features several mechanisms for controlling the effects
of memory misuse, ranging from the most conventional, such as bounds checking for
spatial safety, to more uncommon ones, such as assigning unique identifiers to every
allocated block for ensuring temporal safety.
Choosing a language with manual memory management may seem odd, since safety
is often associated with garbage collection. We made this choice for two reasons. First,
most discussions on memory safety are motivated by its absence from languages like
C that also rely on manual memory management. There is a vast body of research that
tries to make such languages safer, and we would like our account to apply to it. Sec-
ond, we wanted to stress that our characterization does not depend fundamentally on
the mechanisms used to enforce memory safety, especially because they might have
complementary advantages and shortcomings. For example, manual memory manage-
ment can lead to more memory leaks; garbage collectors can degrade performance; and
specialized type systems for managing memory [37,41] are more complex. After a brief
overview of the language, we explore its reasoning principles in §3.
Figure 1 summarizes the language syntax and other basic definitions. Expressions e
include variables x ∈ var, numbers n ∈ Z, booleans b ∈ B, an invalid pointer nil, and
5 Available at https://github.com/micro-policies/micro-policies-coq/tree/
master/memory safety.
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Command Description
x← e Local assignment
x← [e] Read from heap
[e1]← e2 Heap assignment
x← alloc(esize) Allocation
free(e) Deallocation
skip Do nothing
if e then c1 else c2 Conditional
while e do c end Loop
c1; c2 Sequencing
s ∈ S , L ×M (states)
l ∈ L , var ⇀fin V (local stores)
m ∈M , I× Z⇀fin V (heaps)
v ∈ V , Z unionmulti B unionmulti {nil} unionmulti I× Z (values)
O , S unionmulti {error} (outcomes)
I , a countably infinite set
X ⇀fin Y , finite partial functions X ⇀ Y
Figure 1. Syntax, states and values
various operations, both binary (arithmetic, logic, etc.) and unary (extracting the offset
of a pointer). We write [e] for dereferencing the pointer denoted by e.
Programs operate on states consisting of two components: a local store, which maps
variables to values, and a heap, which maps pointers to values. Pointers are not bare
integers, but rather pairs (i, n) of a block identifier i ∈ I and an offset n ∈ Z. The
offset is relative to the corresponding block, and the identifier i need not bear any direct
relation to the physical address that might be used in a concrete implementation on
a conventional machine. (That is, we can equivalently think of the heap as mapping
each identifier to a separate array of heap cells.) Similar structured memory models are
widely used in the literature, as in the CompCert verified C compiler [26] and other
models of the C language [23], for instance.
We write JcK(s) to denote the outcome of running a program c in an initial state s,
which can be either a successful final state s′ or a fatal run-time error. Note that JcK is
partial, to account for non-termination. Similarly, JeK(s) denotes the result of evaluating
the expression e on the state s (expression evaluation is total and has no side effects).
The formal definition of these functions is left to the Appendix; we just single out a few
aspects that have a crucial effect on the security properties discussed later.
Illegal Memory Accesses Lead to Errors The language controls the effect of memory
misuse by raising errors that stop execution immediately. This contrasts with typical C
implementations, where such errors lead to unpredictable undefined behavior. The main
errors are caused by reads, writes, and frees to the current memory m using invalid
pointers—that is, pointers p such that m(p) is undefined. Such pointers typically arise
by offsetting an existing pointer out of bounds or by freeing a structure on the heap
(which turns all other pointers to that block in the program state into dangling ones). In
common parlance, this discipline ensures both spatial and temporal memory safety.
Block Identifiers are Capabilities Pointers can only be used to access memory corre-
sponding to their identifiers, which effectively act as capabilities. Identifiers are set at
allocation time, where they are chosen to be fresh with respect to the entire current
state (i.e., the new identifier is not associated with any pointers defined in the current
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memory, stored in local variables, or stored on the heap). Once assigned, identifiers are
immutable, making it impossible to fabricate a pointer to an allocated block out of thin
air. This can be seen, for instance, in the semantics of addition, which allows pointer
arithmetic but does not affect identifiers:
Je1 + e2K(s) ,

n1 + n2 if JeiK(s) = ni
(i, n1 + n2) if Je1K(s) = (i, n1) and Je2K(s) = n2
nil otherwise
For simplicity, nonsensical combinations such as adding two pointers simply result in
the nil value. A real implementation might represent identifiers with hardware tags and
use an increasing counter to generate identifiers for new blocks (as done by Dhawan et
al. [15]; see §5.1); if enough tags are available, every identifier will be fresh.
Block Identifiers Cannot be Observed Because of the freshness condition above, iden-
tifiers can reveal information about the entire program state. For example, if they are
chosen according to an increasing counter, knowing what identifier was assigned to a
new block tells us how many allocations have been performed. A concrete implementa-
tion would face similar issues related to the choice of physical addresses for new allo-
cations. (Such issues are commonplace in systems that combine dynamic allocation and
information-flow control [12].) For this reason, our language keeps identifiers opaque
and inaccessible to programs; they can only be used to reference values in memory, and
nothing else. We discuss a more permissive approach in §4.2.
Note that hiding identifiers doesn’t mean we have to hide everything associated with
a pointer: besides using pointers to access memory, programs can also safely extract
their offsets and test if two pointers are equal (which means equality for both offsets
and identifiers). Our Coq development also shows that it is sound to compute the size
of a memory block via a valid pointer.
New Memory is Always Initialized Whenever a memory block is allocated, all of its
contents are initialized to 0. (The exact value does not matter, as long it is some constant
that is not a previously allocated pointer.) This is important for ensuring that allocation
does not leak secrets present in previously freed blocks; we return to this point in §4.3.
3 Reasoning with Memory Safety
Having presented our language, we now turn to the reasoning principles that it sup-
ports. Intuitively, these principles allow us to analyze the effect of a piece of code by
restricting our attention to a smaller portion of the program state. A first set of frame
theorems (1, 3, and 4) describes how the execution of a piece of code is affected by
extending the initial state on which it runs. These in turn imply a noninterference prop-
erty, Corollary 1, guaranteeing that program execution is independent of inaccessible
memory regions—that is, those that correspond to block identifiers that a piece of code
does not possess. Finally, in §3.3, we discuss how the frame theorems can be recast in
the language of separation logic, leading to a new variant of its frame rule (Theorem 6).
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(l1,m1) ∪ (l2,m2) , (l1 ∪ l2,m1 ∪m2) (state union)
(f ∪ g)(x) ,
{
f(x) if x ∈ dom(f)
g(x) otherwise
(partial function union)
blocks(l,m) , {i ∈ I | ∃n, (i, n) ∈ dom(m)} (identifiers of live blocks)
ids(l,m) , blocks(l,m) (all identifiers in state)
∪ {i | ∃x, n, l(x) = (i, n)}
∪ {i | ∃p, n,m(p) = (i, n)}
vars(l,m) , dom(l) (defined local variables)
vars(c) , local variables of program c
X # Y , (X ∩ Y = ∅) (disjoint sets)
pi · s , rename identifiers with permutation pi
Figure 2. Basic notation
3.1 Basic Properties of Memory Safety
Figure 2 summarizes basic notation used in our results. By permutation, we mean a
function pi : I→ I that has a two-sided inverse pi−1; that is, pi ◦ pi−1 = pi−1 ◦ pi = idI.
Some of these operations are standard and omitted for brevity.6
The first frame theorem states that, if a program terminates successfully, then we
can extend its initial state almost without affecting execution.
Theorem 1 (Frame OK). Let c be a command, and s1, s′1, and s2 be states. Suppose
that JcK(s1) = s′1, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1), and blocks(s1) # blocks(s2). Then there exists
a permutation pi such that JcK(s1 ∪ s2) = pi · s′1 ∪ s2 and blocks(pi · s′1) # blocks(s2).
The second premise, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1), guarantees that all the variables needed to run
c are already defined in s1, implying that their values do not change once we extend
that initial state with s2. The third premise, blocks(s1) # blocks(s2), means that the
memories of s1 and s2 store disjoint regions. Finally, the conclusion of the theorem
states that (1) the execution of c does not affect the extra state s2 and (2) the rest of the
result is almost the same as s′1, except for a permutation of block identifiers.
Permutations are needed to avoid clashes between identifiers in s2 and those as-
signed to regions allocated by c when running on s1. For instance, suppose that the
execution of c on s1 allocated a new block, and that this block was assigned some iden-
tifier i ∈ I. If the memory of s2 already had a block corresponding to i, c would have to
choose a different identifier i′ for allocating that block when running on s1 ∪ s2. This
change requires replacing all occurrences of i by i′ in the result of the first execution,
which can be achieved with a permutation that swaps these two identifiers.
6 The renaming operation pi · s, in particular, can be derived formally by viewing S as a nominal
set over I [34] obtained by combining products, disjoint unions, and partial functions.
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The proof of Theorem 1 relies crucially on the facts that programs cannot inspect
identifiers, that memory can grow indefinitely (a common assumption in formal models
of memory), and that memory operations fail on invalid pointers. Because of the per-
mutations, we also need to show that permuting the initial state s of a command c with
any permutation pi yields the same outcome, up to some additional permutation pi′ that
again accounts for different choices of fresh identifiers.
Theorem 2 (Renaming states). Let s be a state, c a command, and pi a permutation.
There exists pi′ such that:
JcK(pi · s) =

error if JcK(s) = error
⊥ if JcK(s) = ⊥
pi′ · pi · s′ if JcK(s) = s′
A similar line of reasoning yields a second frame theorem, which says that we
cannot make a program terminate just by extending its initial state.
Theorem 3 (Frame Loop).
Let c be a command, and s1 and s2 be states. If JcK(s1) = ⊥, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1), and
blocks(s1) # blocks(s2), then JcK(s1 ∪ s2) = ⊥.
The third frame theorem shows that extending the initial state also preserves erro-
neous executions. Its statement is similar to the previous ones, but with a subtle twist.
In general, by extending the state of a program with a block, we might turn an erro-
neous execution into a successful one—if the error was caused by accessing a pointer
whose identifier matches that new block. To avoid this, we need a different premise
(ids(s1) # blocks(s2)) preventing any pointers in the original state s1 from referencing
the new blocks in s2—which is only useful because our language prevents programs
from forging pointers to existing regions. Since blocks(s) ⊆ ids(s), this premise is
stronger than the analogous ones in the preceding results.
Theorem 4 (Frame Error).
Let c be a command, and s1 and s2 be states. If JcK(s1) = error, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1),
and ids(s1) # blocks(s2), then JcK(s1 ∪ s2) = error.
3.2 Memory Safety and Noninterference
The consequences of memory safety analyzed so far are intimately tied to the notion of
noninterference [19]. In its most widely understood sense, noninterference is a secrecy
guarantee: varying secret inputs has no effect on public outputs. Sometimes, however,
it is also used to describe integrity guarantees: low-integrity inputs have no effect on
high-integrity outputs. In fact, both guarantees apply to unreachable memory in our
language, since they do not affect code execution; that is, execution (1) cannot modify
these inaccessible regions (preserving their integrity), and (2) cannot learn anything
meaningful about them, not even their presence (preserving their secrecy).
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Corollary 1 (Noninterference). Let s1, s21, and s22 be states and c be a command.
Suppose that vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1), that ids(s1) # blocks(s21) and that ids(s1) #
blocks(s22). When running c on the extended states s1 ∪ s21 and s1 ∪ s22, only one
of the following three possibilities holds: (1) both executions loop (JcK(s1 ∪ s21) =JcK(s1 ∪ s22) = ⊥); (2) both executions terminate with an error (JcK(s1 ∪ s21) =JcK(s1∪s22) = error); or (3) both executions successfully terminate without interfering
with the inaccessible portions s21 and s22 (formally, there exists a state s′1 and permu-
tations pi1 and pi2 such that JcK(s1 ∪ s2i) = pii · s′1 ∪ s2i and ids(pii · s′1) # blocks(s2i),
for i = 1, 2).
Noninterference is often formulated using an indistinguishability relation on states,
which expresses that one state can be obtained from the other by varying its secrets. We
could have equivalently phrased the above result in a similar way. Recall that the hy-
pothesis ids(s1) # blocks(s2) means that memory regions stored in s2 are unreachable
via s1. Then, we could call two states “indistinguishable” if the reachable portions are
the same (except for a possible permutation). In §4, the connection with noninterference
will provide a good benchmark for comparing different flavors of memory safety.
3.3 Memory Safety and Separation Logic
We now explore the relation between the principles identified above, especially regard-
ing integrity, and the local reasoning facilities of separation logic. Separation logic tar-
gets specifications of the form {p} c {q}, where p and q are predicates over program
states (subsets of S). For our language, this could roughly mean
∀s ∈ p, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s)⇒ JcK(s) ∈ q ∪ {⊥}.
That is, if we run c in a state satisfying p, it will either diverge or terminate in a state that
satisfies q, but it will not trigger an error. Part of the motivation for precluding errors
is that in unsafe settings like C they yield undefined behavior, destroying all hope of
verification.
Local reasoning in separation logic is embodied by the frame rule, a consequence
of Theorems 1 and 3. Roughly, it says that a verified program can only affect a well-
defined portion of the state, with all other memory regions left untouched.7
Theorem 5. Let p, q, and r be predicates over states and c be a command. The rule
independent(r,modvars(c)) {p} c {q}
{p ∗ r} c {q ∗ r} FRAME
is sound, where modvars(c) is the set of local variables modified by c, independent(r, V )
means that the assertion r does not depend on the set of local variables V
∀l1 l2m, (∀x /∈ V, l1(x) = l2(x))⇒ (l1,m) ∈ r ⇒ (l2,m) ∈ r,
and p ∗ r denotes the separating conjunction of p and r:
{(l,m1 ∪m2) | (l,m1) ∈ p, (l,m2) ∈ r, blocks(l,m1) # blocks(l,m2)}.
7 Technically, the frame rule requires a slightly stronger notion of specification, accounting for
permutations of allocated identifiers; our Coq development has a more precise statement.
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As useful as it is, precluding errors during execution makes it difficult to use sep-
aration logic for partial verification: proving any property, no matter how simple, of a
nontrivial program requires detailed reasoning about its internals. Even the following
vacuous rule is unsound in separation logic:
{p} c {true} TAUT
For a counterexample, take p to be true and c to be some arbitrary memory read x← [y].
If we run c on an empty heap, which trivially satisfies the precondition, we obtain an
error, contradicting the specification.
Fortunately, our memory-safe language—in which errors have a sensible, predictable
semantics, as opposed to wild undefined behavior—supports a variant of separation
logic that allows looser specifications of the form {p} c {q}e, defined as
∀s ∈ p, vars(c) ⊆ vars(s)⇒ JcK(s) ∈ q ∪ {⊥, error}.
These specifications are weaker than their conventional counterparts, leading to a
subsumption rule:
{p} c {q}
{p} c {q}e
Because errors are no longer prevented, the TAUT rule {p} c {true}e becomes
sound, since the true postcondition now means that any outcome whatsoever is accept-
able. Unfortunately, there is a price to pay for allowing errors: they compromise the
soundness of the frame rule. The reason, as hinted in the introduction, is that prevent-
ing run-time errors has an additional purpose in separation logic: it forces programs to
act locally—that is, to access only the memory delimited their pre- and postconditions.
To see why, consider the same program c as above, x ← [y]. This program clearly
yields an error when run on an empty heap, implying that the triple {emp} c {x = 0}e
is valid, where the predicate emp holds of any state with an empty heap and x = 0
holds of states whose local store maps x to 0. Now consider what happens if we try
to apply an analog of the frame rule to this triple using the frame predicate y 7→ 1,
which holds in states where y contains a pointer to the unique defined location on the
heap, which stores the value 1. After some simplification, we arrive at the specification
{y 7→ 1} c {x = 0∧ y 7→ 1}e, which clearly does not hold, since executing c on a state
satisfying the precondition leads to a successful final state mapping x to 1.
For the frame rule to be recovered, it needs to take errors into account. The solution
lies on the reachability properties of memory safety: instead of enforcing locality by
preventing errors, we can use the fact that memory operations in a safe language are
automatically local—in particular, local to the identifiers that the program possesses.
Theorem 6. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 5, the following rule is sound
independent(r,modvars(c)) {p} c {q}e
{p . r} c {q . r}e
SAFEFRAME
where p . r denotes the isolating conjunction of p and r, defined as
{(l,m1 ∪m2) | (l,m1) ∈ p, (l,m2) ∈ r, ids(l,m1) # blocks(l,m2)}.
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The proof is similar to the one for the original rule, but it relies additionally on
Theorem 4. This explains why the isolating conjunction is needed, since it ensures that
the fragment satisfying r is unreachable from the rest of the state.
3.4 Discussion
As hinted by their connection with the frame rule, the theorems of §3.1 are a form of
local reasoning: to reason about a command, it suffices to consider its reachable state;
how this state is used bears no effect on the unreachable portions. In a more realistic
language, reachability might be inferred from additional information such as typing.
But even here it can probably be accomplished by a simple check of the program text.
For example, consider the hypothetical jpeg decoder from §1. We would like to
guarantee that the decoder cannot tamper with an unreachable object—a window ob-
ject, a whitelist of trusted websites, etc. The frame theorems give us a means to do
so, provided that we are able to show that the object is indeed unreachable; addition-
ally, they imply that the jpeg decoder cannot directly extract any information from this
unreachable object, such as passwords or private keys.
Many real-world attacks involve direct violations of these reasoning principles. For
example, consider the infamous Heartbleed attack on OpenSSL, which used out-of-
bounds reads from a buffer to leak data from completely unrelated parts of the program
state and to steal sensitive information [16]. Given that the code fragment that enabled
that attack was just manipulating an innocuous array, a programmer could easily be
fooled into believing (as probably many have) that that snippet could not possibly access
sensitive information, allowing that vulnerability to remain unnoticed for years.
Finally, our new frame rule only captures the fact that a command cannot influence
the heap locations that it cannot reach, while our noninterference result (Corollary 1)
captures not just this integrity aspect of memory safety, but also a secrecy aspect. We
hope that future research will explore the connection between the secrecy aspect of
memory safety and (relational) program logics.
4 Relaxing Memory Safety
So much for formalism. What about reality? Strictly speaking, the security properties
we have identified do not hold of any real system. This is partly due to fundamental
physical limitations—real systems run with finite memory, and interact with users in
various ways that transcend inputs and outputs, notably through time and other side
channels.8 A more interesting reason is that real systems typically do not impose all the
restrictions required for the proofs of these properties. Languages that aim for safety
generally offer relatively benign glimpses of their implementation details (such access-
ing the contents of uninitialized memory, extract physical addresses from pointers or
compare them for ordering) in return for significant flexibility or performance gains. In
other systems, the concessions are more fundamental, to the extent that it is harder to
8 Though the attacker model considered in this paper does not try to address such side-channel
attacks, one should be able to use the previous research on the subject to protect against them
or limit the damage they can cause [6, 39, 40, 49].
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clearly delimit what part of a program is unsafe: the SoftBound transformation [31],
for example, adds bounds checks for C programs, but does not protect against memory-
management bugs; a related transformation, CETS [32], is required for temporal safety.
In this section, we enumerate common relaxed models of memory safety and eval-
uate how they affect the reasoning principles and security guarantees of §3. Some re-
laxations, such as allowing pointers to be forged out of thin air, completely give up
on reachability-based reasoning. Others, however, retain strong guarantees for integrity
while giving up on some secrecy, allowing aspects of the global state of a program to be
observed. For example, a system with finite memory (§4.5) may leak some information
about its memory consumption, and a system that allows pointer-to-integer casts (§4.2)
may leak information about its memory layout. Naturally, the distinction between in-
tegrity and secrecy should be taken with a grain of salt, since the former often depends
on the latter; for example, if a system grants privileges to access some component when
given with the right password, a secrecy violation can escalate to an integrity violation!
4.1 Forging Pointers
Many real-world C programs use integers as pointers. If this idiom is allowed with-
out restrictions, then local reasoning is compromised, as every memory region may be
reached from anywhere in the program. It is not surprising that languages that strive for
safety either forbid this kind of pointer forging or confine it to clear unsafe fragments.
More insidiously, and perhaps surprisingly, similar dangers lurk in the stateful ab-
stractions of some systems that are widely regarded as “memory safe.” JavaScript, for
example, allows code to access arbitrary global variables by indexing an associative
array with a string, a feature that enables many serious attacks [1,18,29,44]. One might
argue that global variables in JavaScript are “memory unsafe” because they fail to val-
idate local reasoning: even if part of a JavaScript program does not explicitly mention
a given global variable, it might still change this variable or the objects it points to. Re-
enabling local reasoning requires strong restrictions on the programming style [1,9,18].
4.2 Observing Pointers
The language of §2 maintains a complete separation between pointers and other values.
In reality, this separation is often only enforced in one direction. For example, some
tools for enforcing memory safety in C [13, 31] allow pointer-to-integer casts [23] (a
feature required by many low-level idioms [10, 28]); and the default implementation of
hashCode() in Java leaks address information. To model such features, we can extend
the syntax of expressions with a form cast(e), the semantics of which are defined with
some function JcastK : I× Z→ Z for converting a pointer to an integer:
Jcast(e)K(s) = JcastK(JeK(s)) if JeK(s) ∈ I× Z
Note that the original language included an operator for extracting the offset of a
pointer. Their definitions are similar, but have crucially different consequences: while
offsets do not depend on the identifier, allocation order, or other low-level details of the
language implementation (such as the choice of physical addresses when allocating a
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block), all of these could be relevant when defining the semantics of cast. The three
frame theorems (1, 3, and 4) are thus lost, because the state of unreachable parts of
the heap may influence integers observed by the program. An important consequence
is that secrecy is weakened in this language: an attacker could exploit pointers as a
side-channel to learn secrets about data it shouldn’t access.
Nevertheless, integrity is not affected: if a block is unreachable, its contents will not
change at the end of the execution. (This result was also proved in Coq.)
Theorem 7 (Integrity-only Noninterference). Let s1, s2, and s′ be states and c a
command such that vars(c) ⊆ vars(s1), ids(s1) # blocks(s2), and JcK(s1 ∪ s2) = s′.
Then we can find s′1 ∈ S such that s′ = s′1 ∪ s2 and ids(s′1) # blocks(s2).
The stronger noninterference result of Corollary 1 showed that, if pointer-to-integer
casts are prohibited, changing the contents of the unreachable portion s2 has no effect
on the reachable portion, s′1. In contrast, Theorem 7 allows changes in s2 to influence
s′1 in arbitrary ways in the presence of these casts: not only can the contents of this final
state change, but the execution can also loop forever or terminate in an error.
To see why, suppose that the jpeg decoder of §1 is part of a web browser, but that it
does not have the required pointers to learn the address that the user is currently visiting.
Suppose that there is some relation between the memory consumption of the program
and that website, and that there is some correlation between the memory consumption
and the identifier assigned to a new block. Then, by allocating a block and converting
its pointer to a integer, the decoder might be able to infer useful information about the
visited website [22]. Thus, if s2 denoted the part of the state where that location is
stored, changing its contents would have a nontrivial effect on s′1, the part of the state
that the decoder does have access to. We could speculate that, in a reasonable system,
this channel can only reveal information about the layout of unreachable regions, and
not their contents. Indeed, we conjecture this for the language of this subsection.
Finally, it is worth noting that simply excluding casts might not suffice to prevent
this sort of vulnerability. Recall that our language takes both offsets and identifiers into
account for equality tests. For performance reasons, we could have chosen a differ-
ent design that only compares physical addresses, completely discarding identifiers. If
attackers know the address of a pointer in the program—which could happen, for in-
stance, if they have access to the code of the program and of the allocator—they can use
pointer arithmetic (which is generally harmless and allowed in our language) to find the
address of other pointers. If x holds the pointer they control, they can run, for instance,
y ← alloc(1); if x+ 1729 = y then . . . else . . . ,
to learn the location assigned to y and draw conclusions about the global state.
4.3 Uninitialized Memory
Safe languages typically initialize new variables and objects. But this can degrade per-
formance, leading to cases where this feature is dropped—including standard C imple-
mentations, safer alternatives [13, 31], OCaml’s Bytes.create primitive, or Node.js’s
Buffer.allocUnsafe, for example.
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The problem with this concession is that the entire memory becomes relevant to
execution, and local reasoning becomes much harder. By inspecting old values living in
uninitialized memory, an attacker can learn about parts of the state they shouldn’t access
and violate secrecy. This issue would become even more severe in a system that allowed
old pointers or other capabilities to occur in re-allocated memory in a way that the
program can use, since they could yield access to restricted resources directly, leading
to potential integrity violations as well. (The two examples given above—OCaml and
Node.js—do not suffer from this issue, because any preexisting pointers in re-allocated
memory are treated as bare bytes that cannot be used to access memory.)
4.4 Dangling Pointers and Freshness
Another crucial issue is the treatment of dangling pointers—references to previously
freed objects. Dangling pointers are problematic because there is an inherent tension
between giving them a sensible semantics (for instance, one that validates the proper-
ties of §3) and obtaining good performance and predictability. Languages with garbage
collection avoid the issue by forbidding dangling pointers altogether—heap storage is
freed only when it is unreachable. In the language of §2, besides giving a well-defined
behavior to the use of dangling pointers (signaling an error), we imposed strong fresh-
ness requirements on allocation, mandating not only that the new identifier not corre-
spond to any existing block, but also that it not be present anywhere else in the state.
To see how the results of §3 are affected by weakening freshness, suppose we run
the program x ← alloc(1); z ← (y = x) on a state where y holds a dangling pointer.
Depending on the allocator and the state of the memory, the pointer assigned to x could
be equal to y. Since this outcome depends on the entire state of the system, not just
the reachable memory, Theorems 1, 3 and 4 now fail. Furthermore, an attacker with
detailed knowledge of the allocator could launder secret information by testing pointers
for equality. Weakening freshness can also have integrity implications, since it becomes
harder to ensure that blocks are properly isolated. For instance, a newly allocated block
might be reachable through a dangling pointer controlled by an attacker, allowing them
to access that block even if they were not supposed to.
Some practical solutions for memory safety use mechanisms similar to our lan-
guage’s, where each memory location is tagged with an identifier describing the region
it belongs to [11,15]. Pointers are tagged similarly, and when a pointer is used to access
memory, a violation is detected if its identifier does not match the location’s. However,
for performance reasons, the number of possible identifiers might be limited to a rela-
tively small number, such as 2 or 4 [11] or 16 [46]. In addition to the problems above,
since multiple live regions can share the same identifier in such schemes, it might be
possible for buffer overflows to lead to violations of secrecy and integrity as well.
Although we framed our discussion in terms of identifiers, the issue of freshness
can manifest itself in other ways. For example, many systems for spatial safety work
by adding base and bounds information to pointers. In some of these [13, 31], dangling
pointers are treated as an orthogonal issue, and it is possible for the allocator to return
a new memory region that overlaps with the range of a dangling pointer, in which case
the new region will not be properly isolated from the rest of the state.
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Finally, dangling pointers can have disastrous consequences for overall system se-
curity, independently of the freshness issues just described: freeing a pointer more than
once can break allocator invariants, enabling attacks [43].
4.5 Infinite Memory
Our idealized language allows memory to grow indefinitely. But real languages run on
finite memory, and allocation fails when programs run out of space. Besides enabling
denial-of-service attacks, finite memory has consequences for secrecy. Corollary 1 does
not hold in a real programming language as is, because an increase in memory consump-
tion can cause a previously successful allocation to fail. By noticing this difference, a
piece of code might learn something about the entire state of the program. How prob-
lematic this is in practice will depend on the particular system under consideration.
A potential solution is to force programs that run out of memory to terminate imme-
diately. Though this choice might be bad from an availability standpoint, it is probably
the most benign in terms of secrecy. We should be able to prove an error-insensitive
variant of Corollary 1, where the only significant effect that unreachable memory can
have is to turn a successful execution or infinite loop into an error. Similar issues arise
for IFC mechanisms that often cannot prevent secrets from influencing program termi-
nation, leading to termination-insensitive notions of noninterference.
Unfortunately, even an error-insensitive result might be too strong for real systems,
which often make it possible for attackers to extract multiple bits of information about
the global state of the program—as previously noted in the IFC literature [4]. Java, for
example, does not force termination when memory runs out, but triggers an exception
that can be caught and handled by user code, which is then free to record the event and
probe the allocator with a different test. And most languages do not operate in batch
mode like ours does, merely producing a single answer at the end of execution; rather,
their programs continuously interact with their environment through inputs and outputs,
allowing them to communicate the exact amount of memory that caused an error.
This discussion suggests that, if size vulnerabilities are a real concern, they need to
be treated with special care. One approach would be to limit the amount of memory an
untrusted component can allocate [47], so that exhausting the memory allotted to that
component doesn’t reveal information about the state of the rest of the system (and so
that also global denial-of-service attacks are prevented). A more speculative idea is to
develop quantitative versions [6, 39] of the noninterference results discussed here that
apply only if the total memory used by the program is below a certain limit.
5 Case Study: A Memory-safety Monitor
To demonstrate the applicability of our characterization, we use it to analyze a tag-based
monitor proposed by Dhawan et al. to enforce heap safety for low-level code [15]. In
prior work [5], we and others showed that an idealized model of the monitor correctly
implements a higher-level abstract machine with built-in memory safety—a bit more
formally, every behavior of the monitor is also a behavior of the abstract machine.
Building upon this work, we prove that this abstract machine satisfies a noninterference
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property similar to Corollary 1. We were also able to prove that a similar result holds for
a lower-level machine that runs a so-called “symbolic” representation of the monitor—
although we had to slightly weaken the result to account for memory exhaustion (cf.
§4.5), since the machine that runs the monitor has finite memory, while the abstract
machine has infinite memory. If we had a verified machine-code implementation of this
monitor, it would be possible to prove a similar result for it as well.
5.1 Tag-based Monitor
We content ourselves with a brief overview of Dhawan et al.’s monitor [5,15], since the
formal statement of the reasoning principles it supports are more complex than the one
for the abstract machine from §5.2, on which we will focus. Following a proposal by
Clause et al. [11], Dhawan et al.’s monitor enforces memory safety for heap-allocated
data by checking and propagating metadata tags. Every memory location receives a
tag that uniquely identifies the allocated region to which that location belongs (akin
to the identifiers in §2), and pointers receive the tag of the region they are allowed to
reference. The monitor assigns these tags to new regions by storing a monotonic counter
in protected memory that is bumped on every call to malloc; with a large number of
possible tags, it is possible to avoid the freshness pitfalls discussed in §4.4. When a
memory access occurs, the monitor checks whether the tag on the pointer matches the
tag on the location. If they do, the operation is allowed; otherwise, execution halts.
The monitor instruments the allocator to make set up tags correctly. Its implementation
achieves good performance using the PUMP, a hardware extension accelerating such
micro-policies for metadata tagging [15].
5.2 Abstract Machine
The memory-safe abstract machine [5] operates on two kinds of values: machine words
w, or pointers (i, w), which are pairs of an identifier i ∈ I and an offset w. We useW to
denote the set of machine words, and V to denote the set of values. Machine states are
triples (m, rs, pc), where (1) m ∈ I ⇀fin V∗ is a memory mapping identifiers to lists
of values; (2) rs ∈ R⇀fin V is a register bank, mapping register names to values; and
(3) pc ∈ V is the program counter.
The execution of an instruction is specified by a step relation s → s′. If there is no
s′ such that s→ s′, we say that s is stuck, which means that a fatal error occurred dur-
ing execution. On each instruction, the machine checks if the current program counter
is a pointer and, if so, tries to fetch the corresponding value in memory. The machine
then ensures that this value is a word that correctly encodes an instruction and, if so,
acts accordingly. The instructions of the machine, representative of typical RISC archi-
tectures, allow programs to perform binary and logical operations, move values to and
from memory, and branch. The machine is in fact fairly similar to the language of §2.
Some operations are overloaded to manipulate pointers; for example, adding a pointer
to a word is allowed, and the result is obtained by adjusting the pointer’s offset accord-
ingly. Accessing memory causes the machine to halt when the corresponding position
is undefined.
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In addition to these basic instructions, the machine possesses a set of special monitor
services that can be invoked as regular functions, using registers to pass in arguments
and return values. There are two services alloc and free for managing memory, and
one service eq for testing whether two values are equal. The reason for using separate
monitor services instead of special instructions is to keep its semantics closer to the
more concrete machine that implements it. While instructions include an equality test,
it cannot replace the eq service, since it only takes physical addresses into account. As
argued in §4.2, such comparisons can be turned into a side channel. To prevent this,
testing two pointers for equality directly using the corresponding machine instruction
results in an error if the pointers have different block identifiers.
5.3 Verifying Memory Safety
The proof of memory safety for this abstract machine mimics the one carried for the
language in §3. We use similar notations as before: pi · s means renaming every iden-
tifier that appears in s according to the permutation pi, and ids(s) is the finite set of
all identifiers that appear in the state s. A simple case analysis on the possible instruc-
tions yields analogs of Theorems 1, 2 and 4 (we don’t include an analog of Theorem 3
because we consider individual execution steps, where loops cannot occur).
Theorem 8. Let pi be a permutation, and s and s′ be two machine states such that
s→ s′. There exists another permutation pi′ such that pi · s→ pi′ · s′.
Theorem 9. Let (m1, rs, pc) be a state of the abstract machine, and m2 a memory.
Suppose that ids(m1, rs, pc) # dom(m2), and that (m1, rs, pc) → (m′, rs ′, pc′).
Then, there exists a permutation pi such that ids(pi · m′, pi · rs, pi · pc) # dom(m2)
and (m2 ∪m1, rs, pc)→ (m2 ∪ pi ·m′, pi · rs ′, pi · pc′).
Theorem 10. Let (m1, rs, pc) be a machine state, andm2 a memory. If ids(m1, rs, pc) #
dom(m2), and (m1, rs, pc) is stuck, then (m2 ∪m1, rs, pc) is also stuck.
Once again, we can combine these properties to obtain a proof of noninterference.
Our Coq development includes a complete statement.
5.4 Discussion
The reasoning principles supported by the memory-safety monitor have an important
difference compared to the ones of §3. In the memory-safe language, reachability is rel-
ative to a program’s local variables. If we want to argue that part of the state is isolated
from some code fragment, we just have to consider that fragment’s local variables—
other parts of the program are still allowed to access the region. The memory-safety
monitor, on the other hand, does not have an analogous notion: an unreachable memory
region is useless, since it remains unreachable by all components forever.
It seems that, from the standpoint of noninterference, heap memory safety taken
in isolation is much weaker than the guarantees it provides in the presence of other
language features, such as local variables. Nevertheless, the properties studied above
suggest several avenues for strengthening the mechanism and making its guarantees
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more useful. The most obvious one would be to use the mechanism as the target of a
compiler for a programming language that provides other (safe) stateful abstractions,
such as variables and a stack for procedure calls. A more modest approach would be to
add other state abstractions to the mechanism itself. Besides variables and call stacks,
if the mechanism made code immutable and separate from data, a simple check would
suffice to tell whether a code segment stored in memory references a given privileged
register. If the register is the only means of reaching a memory region, we should be
able to soundly infer that that code segment is independent of that region.
On a last note, although the abstract machine we verified is fairly close to our origi-
nal language, the dynamic monitor that implements it using tags is quite different (§5.1).
In particular, the monitor works on a machine that has a flat memory model, and keeps
track of free and allocated memory using a protected data structure that stores block
metadata. It was claimed that reasoning about this base and bounds information was
the most challenging part of the proof that the monitor implements the abstract ma-
chine [5]. For this reason, we believe that this proof can be adapted to other enforce-
ment mechanisms that rely solely on base and bounds information—for example, fat
pointers [13, 25] or SoftBound [31]—while keeping a similar abstract machine as their
specification, and thus satisfying a similar noninterference property. This gives us con-
fidence that our memory safety characterization generalizes to other settings.
6 Related Work
The present work lies at the intersection of two areas of previous research: one on formal
characterizations of memory safety, the other on reasoning principles for programs. We
review the most closely related work in these areas.
Characterizing Memory Safety Many formal characterizations of memory safety orig-
inated in attempts to reconcile its benefits with low-level code. Generally, these works
claim that a mechanism is safe by showing that it prevents or catches typical tempo-
ral and spatial violations. Examples in the literature include: Cyclone [41], a language
with a type system for safe manual memory management; CCured [33], a program
transformation that adds temporal safety to C by refining its pointer type with various
degrees of safety; Ivory [17] an embedding of a similar “safe-C variant” into Haskell;
SoftBound [31], an instrumentation technique for C programs for spatial safety, includ-
ing the detection of bounds violations within an object; CETS [32], a compiler pass
for preventing temporal safety violations in C programs, including accessing dangling
pointers into freed heap regions and stale stack frames; the memory-safety monitor for
the PUMP [5, 15], which formed the basis of our case study in §5; and languages like
Mezzo [35] and Rust [45], whose guarantees extend to preventing data races [7]. Simi-
lar models appear in formalizations of C [24,26], which need to rigorously characterize
its sources of undefined behavior—in particular, instances of memory misuse.
Either explicitly or implicitly, these works define memory errors as attempts to use
a pointer to access a location that it was not meant to access—for example, an out-
of-bounds or free one. This was noted by Hicks [20], who, inspired by SoftBound,
proposed to define memory safety as an execution model that tracks what part of mem-
ory each pointer can access. Our characterization is complementary to these accounts,
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in that it is extensional: its data isolation properties allow us to reason directly about the
observable behavior of the program. Furthermore, as demonstrated by our application
to the monitor of §5 and the discussions on §4, it can be adapted to various enforcement
mechanisms and variations of memory safety.
Reasoning Principles Separation logic [36, 48] has been an important source of inspi-
ration for our work. The logic’s frame rule enables its local reasoning capabilities and
imposes restrictions that are similar to those mandated by memory-safe programming
guidelines. As discussed in §3.3, our reasoning principles are reminiscent of the frame
rule, but use reachability to guarantee locality in settings where memory safety is en-
forced automatically. In separation logic, by contrast, locality needs to be guaranteed
for each program individually by comprehensive proofs.
Several works have investigated similar reasoning principles for a variety of pro-
gram analyses, including static, dynamic, manual, or a mixture of those. Some of these
are formulated as expressive logical relations, guaranteeing that programs are compat-
ible with the framing of state invariants; representative works include: L3 [3], a lin-
ear calculus featuring strong updates and aliasing control; the work of Benton and
Tabereau [8] on a compiler for a higher-order language; and the work of Devriese et
al. [14] on object capabilities for a JavaScript-like language. Other developments are
based on proof systems reminiscent of separation logic; these include Yarra [38], an ex-
tension of C that allows programmers to protect the integrity of data structures marked
as critical; the work of Agten et al. [2], which allows mixing unverified and verified
components by instrumenting the program to check that required assertions hold at in-
terfaces; and the logic of Swasey et al. [42] for reasoning about object capabilities.
Unlike our work, these developments do not propose reachability-based isolation as
a general definition of memory safety, nor do they attempt to analyze how their reason-
ing principles are affected by common variants of memory safety. Furthermore, many of
these other works—especially the logical relations—rely on encapsulation mechanisms
such as closures, objects, or modules that go beyond plain memory safety. Memory
safety alone can only provide complete isolation, while encapsulation provides finer
control, allowing some interaction between components, while guaranteeing the preser-
vation of certain state invariants. In this sense, one can see memory-safety reasoning
as a special case of encapsulation reasoning. Nevertheless, it is a practically relevant
special case that is interesting on its own, since when reasoning about an encapsulated
component, one must argue explicitly that the invariants of interest are preserved by the
private operations of that component; memory safety, on the other hand, guarantees that
any invariant on unreachable parts of the memory is automatically preserved.
Perhaps closer to our work, Maffeis et al. [27] show that their notion of “authority
safety” guarantees isolation, in the sense that a component’s actions cannot influence
the actions of another component with disjoint authority. Their notion of authority be-
haves similarly to the set of block identifiers accessible by a program in our language;
however, they do not attempt to connect their notion of isolation to the frame rule, non-
interference, or traditional notions of memory safety.
Morrisett et al. [30] state a correctness criterion for garbage collection based on
program equivalence. Some of the properties they study are similar to the frame rule,
describing the behavior of code running in an extended heap. However, they use this
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analysis to justify the validity of deallocating objects, rather than studying the possible
interactions between the extra state and the program in terms of integrity and secrecy.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have explored the consequences of memory safety for reasoning about programs,
formalizing intuitive principles that, we argue, capture the essential distinction between
memory-safe systems and memory-unsafe ones. We showed how the reasoning princi-
ples we identified apply to a recent dynamic monitor for heap memory safety.
The systems studied in this paper have a simple storage model: the language of
§2 has just global variables and flat, heap-allocated arrays, while the monitor of §5
doesn’t even have variables or immutable code. Realistic programming platforms, of
course, offer much richer stateful abstractions, including, for example, procedures with
stack-allocated local variables as well as structured objects with contiguously allocated
sub-objects. In terms of memory safety, these systems have a richer vocabulary for
describing resources that programs can access, and programmers could benefit from
isolation-based local reasoning involving these resources.
For example, in typical safe languages with procedures, the behavior of a procedure
should depend only on its arguments, the global variables it uses, and the portions of the
state that are reachable from these values; if the caller of that procedure has a private
object that is not passed as an argument, it should not affect or be affected by the call.
Additionally, languages such as C allow for objects consisting of contiguously allocated
sub-objects for improved performance. Some systems for spatial safety [13, 31] allow
capability downgrading—that is, narrowing the range of a pointer so that it can’t access
outside of a sub-object’s bounds. It would be interesting to refine our model to take
these features into account. In the case of the monitor of §5, such considerations could
lead to improved designs or to the integration of the monitor inside a secure compiler.
Conversely, it would be interesting to derive finer security properties for relaxations like
the ones discussed in §4. Some inspiration could come from the IFC literature, where
quantitative noninterference results provide bounds on the probability that some secret
is leaked, the rate at which it is leaked, how many bits are leaked, etc. [6, 39].
The main goal of this work was to understand, formally, the benefits of memory
safety for informal and partial reasoning, and to evaluate a variety of weakened forms
of memory safety in terms of which reasoning principles they preserve. However, our
approach may also suggest ways to improve program verification. One promising idea
is to leverage the guarantees of memory safety to obtain proofs of program correctness
modulo unverified code that could have errors, in contexts where complete verification
is too expensive or not possible (e.g., for programs with a plugin mechanism).
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Appendix
⊕ ::= + | × | − | = | ≤ | and | or (operators)
e ::= x ∈ var | b ∈ B | n ∈ Z (expressions)
| e1 ⊕ e2 | not e | offset e | nil
c ::= skip | c1; c2 (commands)
| if e then c1 else c2
| while e do c end
| x← e | x← [e] | [e1]← e2
| x← alloc(e) | free(e)
s ∈ S , L ×M (states)
l ∈ L , var ⇀fin V (local stores)
m ∈M , I× Z⇀fin V (heaps)
v ∈ V , Z unionmulti B unionmulti {nil} unionmulti I× Z (values)
O , S unionmulti {error} (outcomes)
I , some countably infinite set
X ⇀fin Y , partial functions X ⇀ Y with finite domain
Figure 3. Syntax and program states
This appendix defines the language of §2 more formally. Figure 3 summarizes the
syntax of programs and repeats the definition of program states. The syntax is standard
for a simple imperative language with pointers.
Figure 4 defines expression evaluation, JeK : S → V . Variables are looked up in
the local-variable part of the state (for simplicity, heap cells cannot be dereferenced in
expressions; the command x ← [e] puts the value of a heap cell in a local variable).
Constants (booleans, numbers, and the special value nil used to simplify error propaga-
tion) evaluate to themselves. Addition and subtraction can be applied both to numbers
and to combinations of numbers and pointers (for pointer arithmetic); multiplication
only works on numbers. Equality is allowed both on pointers and on numbers. Pointer
equality compares both the block identifier and its offset, and while this is harder to
implement in practice than just comparing physical addresses, this is needed for not
leaking information about pointers (see §4.2). The special expression offset extracts the
offset component of a pointer; we introduce it to illustrate that for satisfying our mem-
ory characterization pointer offsets do not need to be hidden (as opposed to block identi-
fiers). The less-than-or-equal operator only applies to numbers—in particular, pointers
cannot be compared. However, since we can extract pointer offsets, we can compare
those instead.
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JxK(l,m) , {l(x) if x ∈ dom(l)
nil otherwiseJbK(s) , bJnK(s) , nJnilK(s) , nil
Je1 + e2K(s) ,

n1 + n2 if Je1K(s) = n1 and Je2K(s) = n2
(i, n1 + n2) if Je1K(s) = (i, n1) and Je2K(s) = n2
or Je1K(s) = n1 and Je2K(s) = (i, n2)
nil otherwise
Je1 − e2K(s) ,

n1 − n2 if Je1K(s) = n1 and Je2K(s) = n2
(i, n1 − n2) if Je1K(s) = (i, n1) and Je2K(s) = n2
nil otherwise
Je1 × e2K(s) , {n1 × n2 if Je1K(s) = n1 and Je2K(s) = n2
nil otherwiseJe1 = e2K(s) , (Je1K(s) = Je2K(s))
Je1 ≤ e2K(s) , {n1 ≤ n2 if Je1K(s) = n1 and Je2K(s) = n2
nil otherwise
Je1 and e2K(s) , {b1 ∧ b2 if Je1K(s) = b1 and Je2K(s) = b2
nil otherwise
Je1 or e2K(s) , {b1 ∨ b2 if Je1K(s) = b1 and Je2K(s) = b2
nil otherwise
Jnot eK(s) , {¬b if JeK(s) = b
nil otherwise
Joffset eK(s) , {n if JeK(s) = (i, n)
nil otherwise
Figure 4. Expression evaluation
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bind(f,⊥) , ⊥
bind(f, error) , error
bind(f, (I, l,m)) ,

(I ∪ I ′, l′,m′) if f(l,m) = (I ′, l′,m′)
error if f(l,m) = error
⊥ otherwise
if(b, x, y) ,

x if b = true
y if b = false
error otherwise
Figure 5. Auxiliary operators bind and if
JskipK+(l,m) , (∅, l,m) Jc1; c2K+(l,m) , bind(Jc2K+, Jc1K+(l,m))
Jif e then c1 else c2K+(l,m) , if(JeK(l,m), Jc1K+(l,m), Jc2K+(l,m))
Jwhile e do c endK+ , fix(λ f (l,m). if(JeK(l,m), bind(JcK+, f(l,m)), (∅, l,m)))
Jx← eK+(l,m) , (∅, l[x 7→ JeK(l,m)],m)
Jx← [e]K+(s) , {(∅, l[x 7→ v],m) if JeK(s) = (i, n) and m(i, n) = v
error otherwise
J[e1]← e2K+(s) , {(∅, l,m[(i, n) 7→ Je2K(l,m)]) if Je1K(s) = (i, n) and m(i, n) 6= ⊥
error otherwise
Jx← alloc(e)K+(l,m) ,{
({i}, l[x 7→ (i, 0)],m[(i, k) 7→ 0 | 0 ≤ k < n]) if JeK(l,m) = n and i = fresh(ids(l,m))
error otherwise
Jfree(e)K+(l,m) ,{
(∅, l,m[(i, k) 7→ ⊥ | k ∈ Z]) if JeK(l,m) = (i, 0) and m(i, n) 6= ⊥ for some n
error otherwise
Figure 6. Command evaluation with explicit allocation sets
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The definition of command evaluation employs an auxiliary partial function that
computes the result of evaluating a program along with the set of block identifiers that
were allocated during evaluation. Formally, JcK+ : S ⇀ O+, where O+ is an extended
set of outcomes defined as Pfin(I)× S unionmulti {error}. We then set
JcK(l,m) =

(l′,m′) if JcK+(l,m) = (I, l′,m′)
error if JcK+(l,m) = error
⊥ if JcK+(l,m) = ⊥
finalids(l,m) =
{
ids(l,m) \ I if JcK+(l,m) = (I, l′,m′)
∅ otherwise
To define JcK+, we first endow the set S ⇀ O+ with the partial order of program
approximation:
f v g , ∀s, f(s) 6= ⊥ ⇒ f(x) = g(x)
This allows us to define the semantics of iteration (the rule for while e do c end) in a
standard way using the Kleene fixed point operator fix.
The definition of JcK+ appears in Figure 6, where several of the rules use a bind
operator (Figure 5) to manage the “plumbing” of the sets of allocated block ids between
the evaluation of one subcommand and the next. The rules for if and while also use an
auxiliary operator if (also defined in Figure 5) that turns non-boolean guards into errors.
The evaluation rules for skip, sequencing, conditionals, while, and assignment are
standard. The rule for heap lookup, x ← [e], evaluates e to a pointer and then looks it
up in the heap, yielding an error if e does not evaluate to a pointer or if it evaluates to
a pointer that is invalid, either because its block id is not allocated or because its offset
is out of bounds. Similarly, the heap mutation command, [e1] ← e2, requires that e1
evaluate to a pointer that is valid in the current memory m (i.e., such that looking it
up in m yields something other than ⊥). The allocation command x ← alloc(e) first
evaluates e to an integer n, then calculates the next free block id for the current machine
state (fresh(ids(l,m))); it yields a new machine state where x points to the first cell in
the new block and where a new block of n cells is added the heap, all initialized to 0.
Finally, free(e) evaluates e to a pointer and yields a new heap where every cell sharing
the same block id as this pointer is undefined.
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